I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court last term issued the third opinion in the Court's history on the question of multiple representation of criminal codefendants and the sixth amendment right to "assistance of counsel." ' In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 2 the Court announced three major interpretations of this sixth amendment guarantee. First, it held that the same constitutional rights accrue to defendants who hire private counsel as accrue to defendants for whom the court appoints a public defender.
3 Second, the Court held that absent objection at trial, a trial judge need only initiate an inquiry into the question of conflict of interest if he "knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists. ", 4 Finally, the Court held that, in order to establish a sixth amendment violation, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must show that an actual conflict of interests adversely affected his lawyer's performance. 5 The Supreme Court's rulings in Cuyler represent a major step toward consistentjudicial enforcement of the constitutional right to counsel. However, the Court's refusal to impose an affirmative duty of inquiry on trial judges in every case perpetuates the injustice that currently arises when a convicted defendant cannot prove from the face of the record that a conflict of interest hindered his lawyer's performance. An affirmative duty of inquiry would alleviate this difficult problem with little added burden on the trial courts.
II. BACKGROUND
In an important 1942 decision, Glasser v. United States, 0 the Supreme Court ruled that by requiring I U.S. CONsT. amend. VI reads in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." In McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) , the Court recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) , the Court held that the fourteenth amendment makes this protection applicable to the states.
2 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct. 1708 Ct. (1980 an attorney to represent two codefendants with conflicting interests, a court denied one of the defendants his sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. The Court did not again address the relationship between multiple representation and the sixth amendment until 1978 when it issued a narrow ruling in Holloway v. Arkansas 7 that trial judges, when faced with timely objections to multiple representation, must either appoint separate counsel or take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk of a conflict of interests is too remote to warrant separate counsel In ruling that a trial judge infringed upon the sixth amendment rights of a defendant by appointingjoint counsel for codefendants with conflicting interests, the Glasser Court relied upon two important factors in the record that revealed a conflict. First, the Court found that in the interest of protecting one codefendant, the shared attorney had declined to cross-examine a government witness whose testimony linked another codefendant to the crime. 9 Second, the Court found that the lawyer had failed to object to the admission of arguably inadmissible evidence, a decision that worked to the detriment of one codefendant and to the benefit of the others.'" Glasser thus required reviewing courts to search trial records to decide whether one attorney representing codefendants violated their rights to effective assistance of counsel. Resulting caselaw, in both state and federal courts, was wildly discordant." Reviewing courts split over the necessity of 9315 U.S. at 73. 10 Id. at 73-74. The Court found evidence in the trial record "indicative of [joint counsel's] ... struggle to serve two masters .... Id. at 75. It held that "the 'assistance of counsel' guaranteed by the sixth amendment contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests." Id. at 70. As to conflicts of interest, some courts read Glasser to require that a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel show an actual conflict existed, 4 while other courts only required showings that a conflict was "substantially possible," 1s "possible," ' 6 "imminently possible," ' 7 or "potential."
18
The Supreme Court clarified some of the confusion when it reexamined this area of the law in
Holloway. There, a public defender appointed to represent three codefendants at a single trial moved for severance and for appointment of separate counsel, alleging the possibility of a conflict of interests. The trial judge held a hearing, which the Supreme Court later found inadequate, and he rejected both claims of the public defender.1 9 s2 Despite strong language in Glasser that no finding of prejudice need be made, other language in the opinion confuses the issue. The Court affirmed Kretske's conviction saying, "we are clear from the record that no prejudice is disclosed as to him." Id. at 77.
is Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072 , 1077 n.7 (5th Cir. 1975 ) (defendant must show an actual significant conflict).
'5 See, e.g., United States v. Valenzuela, 521 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1975 ), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976 .
16 See, e.g., Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 1967 ), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 839 (1967 (Powell, J., dissenting) . The requirement of appointment of separate counsel or a hearing upon timely objection could very easily be construed as a per se rule, due to the difficulty of holding a meaningful inquiry without violating an attorney's ethical demands of confidentiality. Id. at 483-84. Since Glosser, appellate courts have differed on how strong a showing of conflict must be made, and on how certain the reviewing court must be that the alleged conflict existed, before they will find a violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel. Courts also differed with respect to the scope and nature of the affirmative duty of the trial judge to assure that defendants are not deprived of their right to effective assistance of counsel. See text accompanying notes 13-14 supra. These questions were not answered in Holloway.
25 100 S. Ct. 1708 Ct. (1980 . Ct. 1708 Ct. , 1713 Ct. (1980 . The district court accepted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's conclusion that there had been no multiple representation. The court also found that the evidence adduced in the postconviction hearing revealed no conflict of interest.
9 Id. 40id. at 518-19.
41 Id. at 522.
42/d.
41 Sullivan v. Cuyler, 444 U.S. 823 (1979) , vacated, 100 S. Ct. 1708 Ct. (1980 . 44 100 S. Ct. at 1714. 4 5 The Supreme Court first ruled on two preliminary issues, not directly germane to sixth amendment law. The Court found that the court of appeals had not exceeded its proper scope of review when it rejected the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's conclusion that no multiple representation had taken place. Id. at 1714-15. The Habeas Corpus Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1966) , provides that "a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue... shall be presumed to be correct" (certain exceptions enumerated). The Court found that the state court's holding did not fall within this statute because it defendants who retain their own lawyers are entitled to less protection than defendants who receive state-appointed counsel. It held that:
The vital guarantee of the Sixth Amendment would stand for little if the often uninformed decision to retain a particular lawyer could reduce or forfeit the defendant's entitlement to constitutional protection ... [therefore] we see no basis for drawing a distinction between retained and appointed counsel that would deny equal justice to defendants who must choose their own lawyers.1 6 Thus, the Court, in perhaps the clearest ruling in Cuyler, refused to distinguish the use of retained multiple counsel from the existing line of caselaw, Glasser and Holloway, which developed for courtappointed multiple counsel. 47 This ruling cleared the way for the Court to reach the two issues, expressly reserved in Holloway, 45 concerning objections to multiple representation first raised on appeal.
On the issue of the degree of a trial court's duty, the Court held that, absent any objection from the defense, the judge need not initiate an inquiry into conflict of interest unless he "knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists." '4 9 The Court acknowledged Holloway's requirement was a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact. Id. at 1714.
The Court also rejected the state's contention that failings of privately retained counsel did not constitute the state action requisite to habeas corpus relief. Id. at 1715. The Court held that, "when a state obtains a criminal conviction [from a defendant who was denied effective assistance of counsel] it is the state that unconstitutionally deprives the defendant of his liberty." Id.
46 100 S. Ct. at 1716 (footnotes omitted). The Court cited with approval an earlier Third Circuit opinion which refused to distinguish the two situations. Id. at 1716 n.9 (quoting United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 1973 
)):
A rule which would apply one fourteenth amendment test to assigned counsel and another to retained counsel would produce the anomaly that the nonindigent, who must retain an attorney..., would be entitled to less protection ... The effect upon the defendant-confinement as a result of an unfair state trial-is the same whether the inadequate attorney was assigned or retained. [Vol. 71 that trial judges must at least investigate timely objections to multiple representation, but it noted that the Court never has held the sixth amendment to require trial courts to initiate inquiries into the propriety of every occurrence of multiple representation.s° The Court reasoned that since defense attorneys have an ethical obligation to avoid conflicting representations and also to advise the court promptly when a conflict arises, trial courts may rely on their good faith and good judgment."' However, rather than giving complete control over the propriety of multiple representation to defense counsel, 2 the Court imposed the safeguard of a duty of inquiry if a trial judge knows or reasonably should know of a conflict.53 In the Cuyler situation, several factors led the Court to conclude that nothing in the circumstances of the case mandated an inquiry into the possibility of conflict. These included the provision for separate trials for the three codefendants, the opening arguments outlining a defense theory that none of the codefendants was connected with the murders, the opening arguments that indicated a willingness to call witnesses whose testimony was needed, and the tactical reasonableness of resting Sullivan's defense in response to the weak case presented by the prosecution.5
The Cuyler Court also held that "[i]n order to establish a violation of the sixth amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance."1 5 However, once a defendant "shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation [he] need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief.5 The Court refused to extend the "possibility of conflict" concept of Holloway to objections raised for the first time on appeal. 5 7 It reasoned that a possibility of conflict is present in almost every instance of multiple representation, and that if on appeal a defendant need only show possibility to raise the presumption of ineffective assistance, all multiple representation would be 0 100 S. Ct. at 1717.
Id.
52 Much has been written on the inadequate control resulting from complete attorney discretion in this con- 
IV. APPOINTED VERSUS RETAINED COUNSEL
In Culer, the Supreme Court finally laid to rest the notion that different sixth amendment rights inure to defendants depending on whether they are represented by retained or appointed counsel.6 After Glasser, many courts have applied the constitutional guarantee of conflict-free (effective) assistance of counsel to cases involving privately retained' lawyers. 69 (1964) .
An extreme but illustrative colloquy, reported in an article by Professor Lowenthal, points up typical conflict situations which are present regardless ofwhether counsel was appointed or retained:
An attorney appeared in a municipal court for'the. purpose of requesting a reduction of bail for four defendants jointly charged with possession of a large cache of drugs seized from a communal house.
Referring to the first of his clients, the lawyer stated: "This defendant should be released on his own recognizance, Your Honor, because he has no rap sheet. Obviously he is not a hardened criminal and should not be locked up with others who are." When the second defendant's case was called, counsel argued: "No drugs were found in this defendant's bedroom, Your Honor. His chance for an acquittal is great and consequently it is highly likely that he will show up for trial." On behalf of the third One commentator has described the agency rationale as a "concept gone astray." 7 ' 4 He noted that the agency theory is essentially a creature of commercial law. The logical underpinnings of a principal's liability to an innocent third party for the acts of the principal's agent vanish when the concept is superimposed on the attorney-client relationship in criminal cases, because agency doctrine presupposes a principal in a position of knowledge to direct and supervise his agent. The same commentator has called the state action theory "myopic", 7 5 because it fails to focus on the .dfendant'% perception that inept representation has caused his conviction. Whether the lawyer was appoihted or retained is irrelevant to this perception. The Cuyler Court readily disposed of the state action basis for distinguishing appointed from retained counsel by finding the requisite state action in a criminal conviction and sentence imposed by a state court, a part of the government.
7 6 Moreover, the agency and state action rationales overlook the language and policy of the sixth amendment. The Supreme Court has said that the Constitution guarantees the right to "effective assistance of counsel., 77 In Glasser and Holloway, the Court said that effective assistance requires conflict-free counsel. 7 8 This right is no less violated when ineffective representation comes from a privately retained lawyer than it is when counsel is appointed. In any event, Cuyler has now ended the dispute. In refusing to recognize the distinction, the Court stressed that " [a] proper respect for the sixth amendment disarms petitioner's contention that defendants who retain their own lawyers are entitled to less protection than defendants for whom the State appoints counsel." 7 9 defendant, the lawyer began to argue that his client had lived in the area all of his life. The judge interrupted the lawyer, asking him if any drugs had been seized from the bedroom of defendant number three. The lawyer responded, "No comment, Your Honor." The judge countered with the remark: "I suppose that this client also has a prior record, making him a hardened criminal," evoking the response that although the defendant has a prior record, he certainly was not a hardened criminal. The fourth defendant then interrupted the proceedings by eagerly requesting to be represented by the public defender. [Vol. 71
V. THE COURT'S DUTY OF INQUIRY
In Glasser, the Court said that the trial judge has "the duty of seeing that the trial is conducted with solicitude for the essential rights of the accused," including the right to have the effective assistance of counsel.as But the requirements of that duty have eluded the judiciary up to, and perhaps beyond, Cuyler. In Cuyler, the Court held that absent an objection to multiple representation at trial, a trial court need not inquire as to possible conflicts of interest unless it "knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists." 8' The knowledge that multiple representation is occurring, without more, is not sufficient to raise this duty of inquiry. The Court reasoned that since defense lawyers have an ethical obligation to avoid conflicting representations and to advise the court promptly if a conflict of interests arises, trial courts may assume either that joint representation entails no conflict or that the lawyer and his clients knowingly accept the risk.5 Thus, according to Cuyler, a trial judge need only concern himself with the defendant's right to conflict-free counsel if an obvious "particular conflict" exists on the face of the multiple representation before him.8
The Court endorsed the idea of voluntary inquiry by trial judges when a case of multiple representation occurs in criminal trials, noting with express approval that several federal circuits already were invoking their supervisory powers to require similar inquiry.' It also cited proposed 8 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. at 71. The Glasser Court said that the duty was "not to be discharged as a matter of rote, but with sound and advised In Ford, Judge Skelly Wright held that the trial judge should always initially appoint separate counsel under its supervisory powers. Then, if the interests ofjustice and of the clients would be served by joint representation, counsel can suggest this for the court's consideration. 379 F.2d at 125-26. If the Supreme Court approves of this exercise of supervisory powers, perhaps it should require it. With Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c), which provides that federal district courts "shall promptly inquire with respect to ... joint representation and shall personally advise each defendant of his right to the effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation.
' ' 5 But the Court explicitly stopped short of making the 44(c) requirement a part of the sixth amendment right to counsel. The Court may have believed that the proposed federal rule and the ABA Standards for Trial JudgesH which also require inquiry in every case, could combine to reach almost the same end. At the same time, the Court implicitly indicated its willingness to allow the states some flexibility in developing their own standards in this area.
In addition, the Cuyler majority evinced a concern that the imposition of a duty of inquiry in every case would, as a practical matter, bar joint representation for those defendants who desired it for strategic or other reasons. Justice Powell, who wrote the Court's opinion in Cuyler, had expressed this concern when he dissented in Holloway. 8 Courts and commentators have offered two other arguments in favor of allowing defendants to have joint representation if they so desire. First, as Justice Frankfurter noted in his Glasser dissent, joint representation can provide a "means of insurance against reciprocal recrimination." 8 9 Second, some courts have construed the sixth amendment to confer on defendants the right, unfettered by the courts, to choose their own counsel.9°T he Cuyler duty is not the least intrusive way to safeguard a defendant's access to multiple representation. It inadequately protects the sixth amendment right to counsel for defendants who choosejoint representation unaware of the inherent risks involved. In these cases the court might not even question multiple representation. Furthermore, the Cuyler duty fails to assure access to separate counsel for defendants who would be harmed by joint representation, but who cannot disclose the facts underlying the conflict without incriminating themselves, prejudicing their defense, or biasing the trial judge.
Proponents of a prophylactic per se rule barring multiple representation argue that serious limitations on the scope of conflict of interest hearings negate any chance for a meaningful determination at a pretrial hearing. 9 The information required at a conflict hearing might encroach upon an accused's fifth amendment protections against selfincrimination. 92 Ironically, substantive inquiry also can interfere with the sixth amendment right to counsel it seeks to protect by impairing defense strategy or compelling disclosure of confidential information. 93 Undoubtedly, pretrial conflicts of interest hearings can uncover some percentage of conflicts without infringing on defendants' constitutional rights. Such hearings may also result in findings that the chance of conflict is too remote to warrant separate counsel. In a substantial number of cases, however, it may not be possible to determine adequately whether significant possibility of conflict exists. In counsel. Such a presumption would preclude multiple representation even in cases where '[a] common defense... gives strength against a common attack."' 100 S. Ct. at 1718 (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. at 92 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). Although pretrial conflict hearings and separate attorneys will result in increased costs and delays, the judicial economy from avoiding frequent and complex appeals on conflict grounds, as in Cuyler, may offset these costs entirely. But even if the added costs at the pretrial stages exceed the savings on the appellate level, judicial efficiency should never justify infringements on a constitutional guarantee so basic as the sixth amendment right to counsel.
VI. STANDARD ON APPEAL
Holloway required trial courts to appoint separate counsel any time an accused or his attorney claimed that a possible conflict of interest existed, unless the court ascertained that the risk of conflict is "too remote to warrant separate counsel."o Yet, two years later, the Court in Cuyler held that on appeal, a defendant who had raised no objection to multiple representation at trial, "must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance," for "the possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction. [Vol. 71
Significant public policy needs support this distinction. Before or during trial, the alternative to a multiple representation infected with possible conflicts of interest is the appointment (or retention) of individual counsel. After conviction, a finding of ineffective assistance because of a conflict results in reversal. The first scenario involves possible delays in the proceedings and more public defenders. The second potentially may set free persons who otherwise would be found guilty. This distinction surely justifies the different tests laid down in Holloway and Cuyler.
Permitting defendants to upset convictions on appeal merely by demonstrating, after the fact, that a. possibility of conflict existed at trial would be nothing less than a per se rule against multiple representation. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that "a possible conflict inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation. "9 A system by which "almost every" conviction obtained against defendants with multiple representation could be reversed on appeal is untenable.
Unfortunately, the Cuyler standard also has major problems. As Holloway indicated, a rule requiring a defendant to show prejudice would not be susceptible of intelligent, even-handed application. The Court noted that the evil in joint representation of clients with conflicting interests lies in what the advocate refrains from doing at possible pretrial plea negotiations, at trial, and in the sentencing process. These factors do not show up in the record, and hence are not reviewable by appellate courts. 5 0 When it made these comments in Holloway, the Court was not addressing the standard for review on appeal of a Cuyler situation because it found that the judge had violated the defendant's sixth amendment rights at trial. Nevertheless, these ubiquitous problems also plague the efforts of a reviewing court attempting to determine the existence of actual conflicts of interest on the basis of the trial record.
1 'O Trial records do not reflect lost plea bargaining opportunities that result from joint counsel's desire to protect codefendants; nor do they reveal the defense strategies counsel has rejected because of conflicts. Similarly, when a lawyer elects not to cross-examine a witness, his reason does not appear in the record. The lawyer may even cross-examine with apparent zeal, yet completely omit another 9Id. at 1718. lo Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 490-91. 101 See Lowenthal, supra note 52, at 978. "[TIrial-court records normally will mask not only the prejudicial effects of a conflict but also the very existence of the conflict itself." line of questioning disadvantageous to a conflicting interest. Any attempted appellate review must be based on sheer speculation as to the thoughts of the advocate.' 2 Given the choice between a standard on review under which subtle infractions are left standing and a standard by which a substantial number of guilty persons go free, the former, that chosen in Cuyler, is best. But the dilemma merely points up the need to circumvent this kind of appellate review of alleged multiple representation infringements on sixth amendment rights. A pretrial inquiry into possible conflicts of interest would avoid both standards of review. In every case, the judge will have considered and approved or rejected the multiple representation before the trial begins. 
VII. CONCLUSION
Cuyler answered many questions about the multiple representation area upon which state courts and federal circuits previously had split. After Cuyler, courts cannot consider whether counsel was appointed or privately retained in determining how much protection a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel merits. Cuyler also establishes that trial judges are not required to ascertain whether multiple representation presents a conflict of interests sufficient to warrant appointment of separate counsel, unless the court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists. At the same time, the Cuyler Court endorsed voluntary inquiry by trial courts. Presumably this express endorsement will promote the existing trend among trial judges to make an affirmative inquiry whenever faced with a multiple representation situation. To the extent Cuyler advances this trend, only increased sixth amendment protection can result. However, in refusing to rule that trial judges have a constitutional duty to inquire about multiple representation and possible conflicts of interest, the Court left the door open for continued appeals on conflict of interest grounds, which often are difficult or impossible for a reviewing court to determine from the record. 10 See note 94 and accompanying text supra. i04 100 S. Ct. at 1717 n.10.
i05 Id.
106 Id.
